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SUMMARY 
Using identity theory, this paper focuses on examining the relationship 
between directors’ external and internal identities and how these identities can shape 
directors’ monitoring and resource provision behaviors. Directors’ monitoring and 
resource provision behaviors will eventually affect the firm performance. The 
external identity of a director can be defined as the professional position that the 
director is concurrently holding in another organization. The internal identity is 
defined as being a board director in a focal firm. Building on identity theory, I argue 
that when the external identity conflicts with the internal identity, this conflict will 
assuage the director’s motivation to monitor and provide resources. However, when 
the external identity is consistent with the internal identity, this consistency will 
motivate the director to engage in monitoring and resource providing behaviors. 
These behaviors will eventually have a positive impact on firm performance.  
Using data from 1100 Chinese firms listed on both Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges in 2006, I found that directors whose external identities are directors 
on other boards, managers of other companies and government officers or members 
of national people’s congress will positively influence the focal firm performance. 
These results suggested that these three types of external identities are consistent with 
the internal identity of being a board director and will contribute positively to the firm 
performance by providing effective monitoring and resource provision behaviors. 
However, directors with external identity of being employees of financial institutions 
do not necessarily improve focal firm performance.  
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Moreover, prior performance of the firm will have a positive moderating 
effect on the relationship between the proportion of directors with external identities 
as employees of financial institutions and firm performance measured by return on 
sales. Prior performance of the firm will also moderate the relationship between the 
proportion of directors with external identity of being government officers or 
members of national people’s congress and firm performance measured by return on 
sales.   
This paper contributes to corporate governance research on the relationship 
between board directors and firm performance by considering individual differences 
among board directors. Individual differences among board directors were not 
previously captured by agency theory and resource dependence theory, the two 
classical theories used in previous research on corporate governance. Furthermore, 
this study advances the literature by empirically testing the relationship between 
identities of directors and firm performance. In addition, it provides practical 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The relationship between board directors and firm performance has attracted 
much attention among scholars (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003). There are two main 
theoretical perspectives dominating the literature on this topic: agency theory and 
resource dependence theory (Daily et al., 2003).  Agency theory suggested that the 
separation of ownership from control may lead to opportunistic behaviors among 
managers. These opportunistic behaviors will hurt the interests of shareholders (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983). As representatives of shareholders, board directors play an 
important role in monitoring managerial behaviors so as to ensure the maximization 
of shareholders’ wealth (Mizruchi, 1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). Resource dependence theory considers board directors, especially outside 
directors as organization boundary spanners, having access to external resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).   The former theory emphasizes the monitoring function 
of board directors, while the later focuses on resource provision function.  
Although both theories provided excellent theoretical arguments on the 
relationship between directors and firm performance, there are no conclusive results 
in empirical analyses (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998). For example, the 
literature review by Zahra and Pearce (1989) suggested that there are no conclusive 
results for the relationship between board directors and firm performance. They 
suggested that board directors play the role of providing valuable services to 
corporate strategies, rather than providing managerial control. Dalton, Daily, 
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Ellstrand and Johnson (1998) conducted meta-analytic reviews to investigate the 
same set of relationship and had found little systematic linkage between directors and 
performance. However, researchers had obtained some insightful results when they 
distinguished the empirical contexts into studies conducted in developed and 
emerging economies. Though insightful, findings are still inconsistent.  
In developed economies like United States, board composition such as board 
size and representation of outsiders was found to be positively related to performance 
in Fortune 500 corporations (Pearce & Zahra, 1992). These results were marginally 
supported in 100 fast growing U.S. small companies (Daily & Dalton, 1992). 
However, such results were not replicated in an emerging economy such as China. In 
his work, Peng (2004) did not find any significant relationship between directors and 
performance in large Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
An overwhelming amount of empirical studies had focused on either board 
composition (e.g., insider/outsider) or a specific institutional context. Both research 
streams had assumed homogeneity among directors (e.g., outside directors) when 
investigating the relationship between board directors and firm performance. These 
studies had largely ignored individual characteristics of directors that may generate 
conflict of interest among them. Also, there is a lack of comprehensive studies on 
individual differences among board directors. A study of this nature will further our 
understanding of how board composition determines board functions and eventually 
affects firm performance.   
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1.2 Motivation 
Other than being board directors in a firm, most directors will concurrently 
hold positions in other organizations, such as being directors on other boards, being 
top mangers for other companies or are professionals such as bankers, professors, 
lawyers, auditors and so forth. If the role of being a board director can be considered 
as the internal role, other professional positions concurrently held by the director can 
be considered as an external role. From the focal firm’s perspective, a firm will hire 
directors with different external affiliations for diversification purposes. For example, 
for the purpose of financing, firms will hire board directors who are working in 
financial institutions (Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993). The appointment of board directors 
with appropriate experience is associated with superior acquisition performance 
(Kroll, Walters & Wright, 2008). Hiring reputable directors allow firms to gain 
legitimacy and show positive aspects of itself to the public. Hence, directors’ external 
identities play an essential role in determining directors’ behaviors in monitoring and 
resource provision and will have a positive impact on firm performance.   
One of the key limitations of agency theory and resource dependence theory is 
that both theories fail to take into considerations the role of directors’ individual 
characteristics when trying to explain why certain type of board directors will do well 
in monitoring and resource provision. Hillman and her colleagues (2008) regarded 
directors’ multiple roles as identities in the society. They argued that multiple 
identities affect the extent to which directors engage in monitoring and resource 
provision on boards (Hillman, Nicholson & Shropshire, 2008). In other words, some 
identities may motivate directors to engage in monitoring and resource provision, 
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while some may reduce their incentives to take up the responsibilities of being a 
board director.  
Hambrick, Weder and Zajac (2008) suggested that one possible new area of 
focus in corporate governance research could be on directors’ motivation of being 
board directors. Due to multiple identities, directors may think and perform in ways 
that are consistent with their personal interests but are conflicting with their role of 
being board directors in a firm. Hence, this paper focuses on examining the external 
identities of board directors and how the relationship between external and internal 
identities will shape a director’s behaviors of monitoring and resource provision. 
These behaviors will eventually affect firm performance.  
 
1.3 Contributions 
This paper contributes to the corporate governance literature on board 
directors in two main ways. First, this paper is noteworthy in that it elucidated the 
link between directors’ external identities and firm performance by conducting a 
comprehensive examination on how the relationship between external and internal 
identities shapes directors’ behaviors and affect firm performance. Heeding the call of 
Hambrick et al. (2008) for a new research direction on corporate governance, this 
paper investigates directors’ motivations for being board directors by taking into 
consideration the possible motivating role played by their diversified external 
identities. In addition, by using a novel approach to examine the linkages between 
board directors and firm performance, this paper will enrich empirical knowledge on 
this domain. Second, by using identity theory, this paper brings a fresh theoretical 
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perspective to corporate governance research. Based on identity theory, this paper is 
able to address some of inherent limitations of agency theory and resource 
dependence theory, the two classical theories most often used in research on board 
functions. 
 
1.4 Organization of Study 
The structure of this paper is as follow. Chapter 2 will review the literature on 
identity theory. In additional, Chapter 2 will clarify the conceptual definition of 
“identity” and put forth the key arguments on why identity theory provides a suitable 
framework for corporate governance research. By drawing a comparison between this 
study and other existing studies on identities of board directors, Chapter 2 will also 
illustrate the convergences and divergences of this study from other extant studies. 
Based on these convergences and divergences, I will highlight the merits of my study 
in relations to other studies of the same nature. Based on the literature review in 
Chapter 2, Chapter 3 will present the theoretical model and hypotheses (main and 
moderating effects). Subsequently in Chapter 4, I will introduce the methodology of 
this study. Key sections in Chapter 4 include sample construction, list of variables, 
analytical approach and regression models. The empirical results are reported in 
Chapter 5. Lastly in Chapter 6, I will discuss the findings, limitations and future 
research directions. The conclusion for this paper will also be presented.   
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter will review previous research relevant to identity theory and 
identities of board directors. By reviewing these studies, this section will put forth the 
key theoretical arguments on identities and board directors and will also provide a 
clear differentiation between the current study and other existing studies. In this 
chapter, I begin with the introduction of identity theory. Next, I will define what 
identity is and provide a working definition of external and internal identities as 
applied in this paper. Third, I will list down the similarities and differences of this 
paper with an existing study in order to provide a picture of how this study will 
advance the current literature.  
 
2.1 Identity Theory 
Identity theory suggested that individuals have multiple role identities in 
society (Stryker, 1968) and these identities will shape individual’s behaviors (Callero, 
1985). However, multiple identities may conflict with each other (Kreiner et al. 2006) 
and the interrelationships between these different identities will affect individual’s 
behaviors (Hillman et al. 2008).  
As suggested by Stryker and Burke (2000), there are two research streams in 
identity theory. One stream concentrates on examining “how social structures affect 
the structure of self and how the structure of the self influences social behaviors” 
(Stryker & Burke, 2000). The other concentrates on “internal dynamics of self-
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processes and these processes affect social behaviors” (Stryker & Burke, 2000). This 
paper focuses on the latter.  
Board directors often have multiple identities and these identities may conflict 
with each other (Kreiner et al. 2006). However, not all identities are conflicting in 
nature. During identity conflict, some identities become salient while some do not. 
Directors’ behaviors are driven by the identities which are not salient. However the 
saliency of identities is not permanent. When environmental conditions change, the 
saliency of identities is also likely to change. 
The reasons for applying identity theory are as follow: Inspired by Hillman et 
al’s (2008) paper on using identity theory to understand directors’ identities, I 
propose that identity theory is a useful concept in that it draws our attention to 
directors’ individual differences. Having said that, identity theory can be used to 
explain how individual differences among directors can have a differential effect on 
board functions, as well as firm performance. The above cannot be captured and 
explained by agency theory and resource dependence theory, the two most commonly 
used theories in corporate governance research. Besides, adopting identity theory is 
an innovation for corporate governance studies as it provides a possible explanation 
to address the inconclusive relationship between board directors and firm 
performance. This is especially important as prior research using agency theory and 
resource dependency theory is inconclusive largely because they do not take into 
consideration individual differences among directors and these differences can lead to 
different effects on firm performance.  
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2.2 Definitions of Identity and External Identity 
2.2.1 Definition of identity 
Identity theory is most commonly use in social psychology and sociology 
research (e.g., Stryker, 1968; Stryker & Serpe, 1994). While social psychologists 
focused on the nature of identity salience, often linking it to other theories and 
psychological practices, such as psychological centrality and self-measurement 
(Stryker & Serpe, 1994; Burke, 1980), sociologists are interested in applying identity 
salience to family context (Stryker & Serpe, 1994). In this paper, identity can be 
defined as “parts of a self composed of the meanings that persons attach to the 
multiple roles they typically play in highly differentiated contemporary societies”  
(Stryker & Burke, 2000).                                                                                               
In this paper, I define the identity of a director as the professional position 
held by the director in an organization. For a board director of a company, it is quite 
common that him/her to have other professional position (s) in other organization (s) 
since he/she is likely to have multiple social identities. In this paper, being a board 
director of a firm can be considered as the internal identity of a director while other 
professional positions concurrently held by the director can be considered as his/her 
external identities.  
Hillman and her colleagues (2008) found that “multiple identities of directors 
drive boardroom behavior and that the strength of identification with any given 
identity will predict a director’s monitoring and resource provision”. According to 
identity theory, when an external identity conflicts with the internal identity, the 
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conflict will attenuate directors’ motivation to monitor managers and provide 
resources. However, when an external identity is consistent with the internal identity, 
the consistency will motivate directors to engage in monitoring and resource 
providing behaviors. Hence, the consistency between external and internal identities 
could facilitate board effectiveness to achieve the goal of maximizing shareholders’ 
value. 
2.2.2 Definition of external identity 
In this study, the external identity of board directors can be classified 
according to the professional positions they concurrently hold outside the focal firm. 
Specifically in this paper I will examine four types of external identities: i) being 
board directors on other boards; ii) being managers of other companies; iii) being 
employees of financial institutions and iv) being government officers or members of 
national people’s congress. Previous studies have found that these four types of 
external identities will have an influence on firm’s decision making (e.g., Carpenter 
& Westphal, 2001; Kor & Misangyi, 2008; Hillman, Zardkoohi & Bierman, 1999; 
Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993). Therefore, it is plausible that these four types of external 
identities will have an impact on director’s behaviors of monitoring and resource 
provision, which in turn, affect firm performance. 
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 2.3 Comparison of the Application of Identity Theory with an 
Existing Study   
Inspired by Hillman et al’s (2008) paper on the influence of identity in 
boardroom behaviors, this paper will adopt identity theory to explain why differences 
in directors’ characteristics will have different effects on board functions. However, 
the nature of my theoretical arguments is different from Hillman et al (2008). While 
Hillman et al’s (2008) paper argued that the strength of a director’s identification 
with different parties, including the organization, being a director, being a CEO, 
shareholders, customers and suppliers, determines the effectiveness of the director on 
monitoring and resource provision functions, this paper argued that the relationship 
between an external identity and the internal identity will determine board functions 
and eventually affect firm performance.  
Although Hillman and her colleagues (2008) and I focus on director-specific 
characteristics, our classification of directors’ characteristics is different. Though 
Hillman et al’s (2008) paper had focused on director-specific identities, the identities 
that they focused on have no strong theoretical basis. To address the limitations of 
Hillman et al’s (2008) paper, this study classifies directors’ identities based on their 
external professional positions. The external professional positions chosen are widely 
examined in extant literature and prior studies have shown that these professional 
identities have a significant effect on firm’s decision making.  
Both Hillman and her colleagues (2008) and I propose that directors’ 
identities will affect two board functions, namely, monitoring and resource provision. 
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Theoretically, these two board functions are mediators that explain the relationship 
between directors’ external identities and firm performance. This paper is noteworthy 
in that it advances Hillman et al’s (2008) paper by conducting empirical testing to 
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CHAPTER 3 DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 
In this chapter, I will first present a theoretical model for the paper. Based on 
the model, I developed several hypotheses to examine how the interactions between 
different external identities and internal identity shape directors’ behaviors of 
monitoring and resource provision. These behaviors will in turn affect firm 
performance. Finally, I explore the relationship between directors with external 
identities and firm performance by introducing a moderator, prior firm performance, 
which is an activator to test the strength and stability of this relation.  
 
3.1 Model of Study 
The model of this study is outlined in Figure 3.1. There are two theoretical 
models. The first model examines the main effect of the relationship between 
directors with different external identities and firm performance. The second model 
examined the moderating effect of the focal firm’s historical profitability on the 
interaction between internal and external identities. The moderating effect of focal 
firm’s historical profitability will eventually determine directors’ monitoring and 
resource provision behaviors.  
Hypotheses 1 to 4 hypothesized general relationships between directors with 
different external identities and firm performance. Hypotheses 5 to 6 further explore 
whether these relationship changes under different boundary conditions. This is an 
additional procedure to test the strength and stability of these relationships. Past 
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performance is used as one of the boundary conditions. When firms experience poor 
performance, top managers will face intense pressure to improve future performance. 
Under intense performance pressure, managers are likely to be more opportunistic in 
their behaviors so as to improve their personal performance.  In a same vein, when 
firms experience period of low unprofitability and poor performance, directors will 
reevaluate the extent of conflict or consistency between their internal and external 
identities. This comparison will lead to adjustments in their monitoring and resource 
provision behaviors.  
 
3.2 Hypotheses Development 
Board diversity, a requirement to satisfy the increased interest in board’s 
strategic role, has great potential to enhance the conflicts between strategic functions 
of board and its governance function (Goodstein, Gautam & Boeker, 1994). The 
diversified strategic backgrounds of directors can have direct relationships with board 
functions, either positively or negatively. These relationships in turn will have an 
impact on firm performance. In this study, I classify the external identities of 
directors based on their diversified backgrounds and the working positions that they 
are concurrently holding. In this study, I identify four external identities of directors 
which were commonly discussed in previous literature: i) directors of other 
companies (e.g., Carpenter & Westphal, 2001); ii) managers of other companies (e.g., 
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003); iii) employees of financial institutions (e.g., Stearns & 
Mizruchi, 1993) and iv) government officers or members of national people’s 
congress (e.g., Hillman et al., 1999).  
                                                                                                                                     14 
3.2.1 Main effects: The relationships between directors’ external identities and 
firm performance 
Multiple directorships indicate high monitoring and advising capabilities of 
directors (Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003). Ferris and his colleagues (2003) 
found that multiple directorships do not diminish a director’s monitoring and resource 
providing behaviors. Under the assumption of socio-cognitive perspective, the 
knowledge gained by directors from other directorships can be relevant to the 
strategic issues of a focal firm. Directors with external network ties to other boards 
can provide strategic knowledge and experience to strategic decision making of the 
focal firm (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001).  
In addition, professional directors have motivation to engage in monitoring 
and resource provision behaviors. Professional directorships will enhance the strength 
of identification of being a director (Hillman et al., 2008). Besides, having good 
reputation is important for professional directors in order to attract other directorships 
in the market of directors (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Thus, directors with external 
identity of being directors on other boards are willing to provide independent and 
effective monitoring of managerial behaviors. They are also likely to bring in 
necessary knowledge for strategic decision making in order to gain “the favorable 
reputation as active representatives of shareholder welfare” (Zajac & Westphal, 1996).  
Since multiple directorships are positively related to both capabilities and 
motivation of being a board director, the external identity of being directors on other 
boards is consistent with the internal identity of being a board director in a focal firm. 
Therefore, I put forth the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: The proportion of directors with external identity of 
concurrently being directors on other boards is positively related to focal firm 
performance.  
 
Besides holding directorships on other boards, it is also common for directors 
to hold managerial positions in other organizations. Directors with management 
experience have the knowledge and expertise to understand managerial behaviors and 
organizational management. Hence, monitoring is especially effective when directors 
have abundance of management experience (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Executive 
experience can also increase the quality of advices sought by CEO (McDonald, 
Khanna & Westphal, 2008). Directors could monitor managerial behaviors through 
advising and providing useful suggestions to help managers do the right things. 
Hence, directors’ managerial experience could facilitate efficient monitoring.  
This external identity is also consistent with the internal identity on resource 
provision function. Hillman et al’s (2008) paper suggested that directors with a strong 
identification such as CEO are willing to perform resource provision function. The 
external identity of being managers in other companies equips directors with 
advantages in terms of resources and incentives to engage in resource provision. That 
is to say, directors with executive experience, having the relevant expertise and 
knowledge (Kor & Misangyi, 2008) can be a form of human capital for the focal firm. 
In addition, multiple affiliations equip these directors with access to resources of 
different organizations. Furthermore, seeking advice from directors is a common 
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routine for top managers. A director who is also holding a managerial position in 
another firm could facilitate the function of providing advice.  
Taken together, it seems to suggest that external identity of being managers in 
other companies can facilitate monitoring and resource provision behaviors of board 
directors, therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The proportion of directors with external identity of 
concurrently being managers of other companies is positively related to focal firm 
performance.  
 
Financial resources are essential for companies to implement strategies and 
improve performance. Hence, directors with external identity of being employees of 
financial institutions play an important role on boards. Resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) view financial institution representatives on a firm’s board 
as external financial resource explorers. Their presence on boards could increase the 
chances of accessing financial support for the focal firms. Stearns and Mizruchi (1993) 
found that having the directors on boards from different types of financial institutions 
facilitated different forms of borrowings.  
The financial resources brought in by directors from financial institutions 
could be viewed as a form of investment from these institutions. As investors, board 
representatives from these financial institutions have incentive to monitor how the 
focal firms utilize their money. They tend to be more involved and are more likely to 
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play an important role during decision making. They are also more likely to track the 
implementation of organizational activities, such as, strategy and investment projects.   
In summary, the more directors who concurrently working for financial 
institutions, the more financial resources the focal firms can gain for their needs. The 
more investment the directors bring in, the higher monitoring motivation they have. 
Thus, companies with financial institution representatives on boards have great 
chance to achieve higher performance through sufficient financial support and 
effective vigilance on managers’ behaviors. Since the external identity of being 
employees of financial institutions will facilitate resource provision and monitoring 
functions, this external identity is consistent with internal identity and could 
contribute to firm performance. Therefore, I put forth the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The proportion of directors with external identity of 
concurrently being employees of financial institutions is positively related to focal 
firm performance.  
 
Compared to other directors, directors with government affiliations are able to 
grant increased access to scarce resources and confer unique policy privileges. These 
linkages with government could benefit companies in terms of “getting timely 
information, ease in accessing resources, greater influence and reduction in 
uncertainty and transaction cost” (Hillman, Zardkoohi & Bierman, 1999). Since 
government officials have the authority to distribute resources, directors who are 
government officials or have connections with them are able to help a focal firm get 
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the access to the resources they need. Additionally, political connections increase the 
interaction between firms and government. This interaction could in turn result in 
policies being passed in the favor of the companies (Pittman, 1977).  
From the perspective of monitoring, the external identity of being government 
officials or members of national people’s congress is likely to conflict with the 
internal identity of being a board director in a focal firm. For example, in China’s 
state owned enterprises, as managerial interests always present state interests in 
Chinese firms, directors holding government positions represent state’s interests, thus 
they are unable to provide true independent monitoring (Peng, 2002, 2004). Similarly, 
in other economic contexts, since government continues to play an influential role in 
decision making process, directors with external identity associated with government 
may not be able to provide independent and objective monitoring. Instead, they are 
likely to influence the strategic decision making in their own favor.   
In summary, although directors with external identity affiliated with 
government may not be able to provide effective monitoring, the benefits in terms of 
access to resources and policy privileges from government affiliations are likely to 
result in increased firm value (Hillman et al., 1999). Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The proportion of directors with external identity of 
concurrently being government officers or members of national people’s congress is 
positively related to focal firm performance.  
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3.2.2 Moderating effects: Prior firm performance as a moderator 
To further explore the impact directors’ external identities on firm 
performance, I introduce prior performance of the focal firms as a moderator to track 
and isolate directors’ influences on firm performance by taking into consideration the 
focal firm performance under different historical records. Prior performance is an 
activator that enhances or attenuates the relationship between external and internal 
identities. It is an important procedure to include prior firm performance as a 
moderator to further investigate the strength and stability of the relationship between 
directors with different external identities and firm performance.  
Poor prior performance will result in top managers facing intense pressure to 
improve future performance. Similarly, directors will have to put in increased effort 
to monitor managerial behaviors and to bring in additional resources to help improve 
firm performance. As firm performance is positively related to the number of 
directorships (Ferris et al., 2003), directors with multiple director appointments have 
the incentive to monitor managerial behaviors and provide resources to improve firm 
performance so that they can protect their reputation and their director “career”. For 
directors with managerial role identities, they have the incentive to monitor and 
provide advice to help mangers in focal firm since they are likely to have been in 
similar situations themselves and they know how important it is for directors to 
provide help during times of crisis. Managers are more likely to appropriate 
shareholders’ wealth when a focal firm has good prior performance than the times of 
poor performance, because there are much more available resources for them to 
appropriate. Hence, during times of good performance, directors also have to devote 
                                                                                                                                     20 
intense attention to managerial behaviors to avoid shareholders’ wealth being 
appropriated by managers.  
For directors with external identities of being directors and managers of other 
companies, regardless of how the prior focal firm had performed previously, their 
motivation of engaging in monitoring and resource provision would not change as 
their motivation for monitoring and resource provision remains high during both poor 
and good performance. Thus, prior performance will not moderate the strength of the 
relationship between directors with external identity of being directors on other 
boards and firm performance and the relationship between directors with external 
identity of being managers of other companies and firm performance.  
Stearns and Mizruchi (1993) found that firms with higher debt ratio were less 
likely to borrow money from financial institutions whose representatives served on 
the boards.  As an investor of the firm, directors affiliated with financial institutions 
are unlikely to invest their money on the company during periods of poor 
performance. Besides, as a board director, the investor will have privileged inside 
knowledge about the firm which he or she has a directorship in. This information will 
keep these directors rational when they evaluate whether to bring in additional 
financial resources to the focal firm. Companies with poor performance have greater 
incentive to take higher risk that is associated with higher return than those with good 
performance (Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993). Managers in these companies are likely to 
perform inconsistently with shareholder’s interest, because they tend to focus on 
short-term profits that could improve their personal performance immediately, not on 
long-term development of a healthy company. Since financial institution 
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representatives on boards have to take greater risk for their investment and put in 
more effort on monitoring, they are less likely to invest in a company with poor prior 
performance. This is because investing their money in such firms is highly risky and 
returns from these investments are highly uncertain.  
Since prior performance of the firm provides the necessary information for 
directors to gauge the firm’s current situation, it will determine a director’s judgment 
on the company. Firms with outstanding prior performance will find it easier to attract 
financial resources brought by directors who are concurrently working for financial 
institutions than those with poor performance. Accordingly, prior firm performance 
could determine the amount of resources brought in by directors affiliated with 
financial institutions, and thus, be a moderator to moderate the strength of the 
relationship between directors as representatives of financial institutions on boards 
and firm performance. Good prior performance will enhance the consistency of the 
director’s internal and external identities, while poor prior performance will attenuate 
the consistency. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Prior performance has a positive moderating effect on the 
relationship between the proportion of directors with external identity of being 
employees of financial institutions and focal firm performance; such that their 
positive relationship will be enhanced when a focal firm has high prior performance, 
and attenuated when a focal firm has low prior performance. 
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Directors with external identity as government officials or as members of 
national people’s congress will have access to special resources and policy privileges 
that can benefit the firm performance (Hillman, et al., 1999). These scarce resources 
and policy privileges can be only obtained through political ties. Good prior 
performance of the focal firm acts as evidence to convince these directors to bring in 
valuable resources. Similar, good prior performance can be a motivator that motivates 
these directors to maintain their resource provision behaviors.  When a focal firm has 
good prior performance, directors’ external identity of being affiliated with 
government is consistent with internal identity of resource provision. Conversely, 
when focal firm experienced poor prior performance, the focal firm is highly 
dependent on the scarce resources and policy privileges accrued from government 
affiliated board directors since these benefits are crucial for firm’s recovery. However, 
poor prior performance will attenuate the motivation of directors engaging in resource 
provision behaviors.  
Directors affiliated with government will not be able to provide effective 
monitoring of managerial behaviors since their interests represents those of the state, 
not those of the shareholders. Since managerial opportunistic behaviors are more 
detrimental when the focal firm experienced poor prior performance than when the 
firm had good prior performance, monitoring function of board directors is more 
important in the former condition than in the latter.  Therefore, the lack of effective 
monitoring, due to the conflict between external and internal identities, will be more 
detrimental when the focal firm experienced poor prior performance than when it had 
a good historical record. Accordingly, I hypothesize that: 
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Hypothesis 6: Prior performance has a positive moderating effect on the 
relationship between the proportion of directors with the external identity of 
government officers or members of national people’s congress and focal firm 
performance; such that, their positive relationship will be enhanced when a focal firm 
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CHAPTER 4 METHODS 
 
4.1 Sample Selection and Data collection 
This paper focuses on Chinese firms listed on both Shenzhen and Shanghai 
Stock Exchanges. The year of data is 2006. Data for this study is collected from three 
data sources. First, data were collected from Sinofin database which includes firm 
performance variables: net income, total assets, equity and revenue, Global Industry 
Category Standard (GICS) code and ownership. Second, data were collected from 
GTA RSC system which includes the information of directors’ concurrent positions, 
working companies and board size. Third, the data of registration date of each listed 
firm were collected from the companies’ annual reports.  
After excluding observations with missing data and outliers, the final sample 
consists of 1100 observations with 665 listed firms from Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and 435 listed firms from Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The data are distributed in 22 




4.2 Definitions of Variables 
Dependent variables 
Since the Chinese capital market is not well developed, market-based measure 
may not reflect the real performance (Peng, 2004). Thus, I have chosen accounting-
Table 1 goes about here 
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based measure to define firm performance. After reviewing the relevant literature, 
there are no consensuses on measuring firm performance. In light of the lack of 
consensus, I chose returns on assets (ROA= Net Income / Total assets), returns on 
sales (ROS= Net Income / Revenue) and returns on equity (ROE= Net Income / 
Equity), three of the most commonly used indicators in existing literature (Peng, 2004; 
Daily & Dalton, 1992), as accounting-based financial indicators.  
Independent variables 
There are four independent variables representing four categories of external 
identities.  
Proportion of directors with external identity of being directors on other boards = 
The number of directors with multiple directorships / Board size 
 
Proportion of directors with external identity of being managers in other companies 
= The number of directors holding managerial positions in other firms / Board size 
 
Proportion of directors with external identity of being employees in financial 
institutions = The number of directors working for financial institutions / Board size 
 
Proportion of directors with external identity of being government officers or 
members of national people’s congress = The number of directors who are 
concurrently government officers or members of national people’s congress / Board 
size 
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To be emphasized, this paper does not consider how an individual director 
affects firm performance. As a director can have more than one external identity, 
he/she can be a manager of a bank and a director of another company simultaneously. 
Focusing on individual directors may cause conflicting conclusions if their multiple 
external identities have opposite effects on firm performance. Therefore, this study 
focuses on different categories of external identities to investigate the relationship 
between the proportion of a certain external identity on board and firm performance.  
Moderators 
Prior firm performance in 2005, measured in the form of ROA of 2005, ROS 
of 2005 and ROE of 2005 were used as moderators.  
Control variables 
Control variables are selected based on previous literature on related topics. 
First, firm size measured by the log of total assets was used to control size-related 
impact on performance. Second, firm’s age was controlled for since it could reflect 
the extent of operating experience in related industries and this may affect firm 
performance. Third, many Chinese firms were transformed from state-owned 
enterprises to private firms during economic transitions (Peng, 2004). Because of 
their government affiliations, these firms may have better performance than non-
SOEs. State ownership, which was defined as the largest shareholder was state and 
measured by dummy variable: 1-SOE, 0-non-SOE, was used to control the effect of 
state affiliations on firm performance. The reason state ownership was not measured 
by continuous value was that using continuous value may not be able to reflect the 
relationship between state ownership and firm performance. For example, the 
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company with 20% state holding shares may have better performance than the one 
with 30% state holding shares, because state is the largest shareholder in the company 
with 20% state holding shares but not in the one with 30% state holding shares. It is 
also possible that the company with more state holding shares has better performance 
than the one with less state holding shares, because state is the largest shareholder in 
the former company but not in the later one. Therefore, it is more accurate to use 
dummy variable to test the effect of state affiliations on firm performance. Fourth, 
types of industries were used as control variables in order to control for performance 
variance caused by industrial effects. The classification of industries was based on the 
first four digits of GICS code. Since there are 22 industries in my sample, I created 21 
dummy variables to control industry effects. 
 
4.3 Analytical Approach and Regression Models 
As the data are cross sectional with continuous dependent variables, OLS 
regression is applied as the analytical approach. I constructed the main effect model 
by including all the independent variables (proportion of directors with external 
identities of being directors on other boards, managers of other companies, employees 
of financial institutions and government officers or members of national people’s 
congress) and control variables (firm size, firm age, state ownership dummy and 
industry dummies) in one regression model. Based on the main effect model, I added 
prior firm performance and the interaction term (prior performance multiplied by 
each independent variable) in the moderating effect model. The regression models are 
as follow: 
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Main effect model: 
Yt = b0t + b1t DIRt + b2t MGRt + b3t FINt + b4t GOVt + b5t FIRM_SIZEt +b6t 
FIRM_AGEt + b7t OWN_DUMt + ∑ b8it INDit  + εt 
 
Moderating effect model: 
Yt = b0t + b1t DIRt + b2t MGRt + b3t FINt + b4t GOVt + b5t Yt-1 + b6t DIRt*Yt-1  
+ b7t MGRt*Yt-1 + b8t FINt*Yt-1 + b9t GOVt*Yt-1 + b10t FIRM_SIZEt  
+b11t FIRM_AGEt + b12t OWN_DUMt + ∑ b13it INDit +  εt 
 
 Yt : ROA, ROS or ROE in year t, t=2006 
Yt-1 : ROA, ROS or ROE in year t-1, t-1=2005 
DIRt : proportion of directors with external identity of being directors on other 
boards in year 2006 
MGRt : proportion of directors with external identity of being managers of 
other companies in year 2006 
FINt : proportion of directors with external identity of being employees of 
financial institutions in year 2006 
GOVt : proportion of directors with external identity of being government 
officers or members of national people’s congress in year 2006 
FIRM_SIZEt : firm size (log of total assets) in year 2006 
FIRM_AGEt : firm age until year 2006 
OWN_DUMt : state ownership dummy in year 2006 
INDit : industry dummy i in year 2006 
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
 
5.1 Main Effects 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of main 
variables. Hypothesis 1 predicts that the proportion of directors with external identity 
of being directors on other boards is consistent with the internal identity of being 
board directors in a focal firm. This external identity will enhance directors’ 
behaviors of monitoring and resource provision and benefit firm performance. It 
received empirical supports in Model 1 and 3, but not Model 2 shown in Table 3.  
The results revealed that multiple directorships of board directors benefit 
return on assets and return on equity, but it does not have a direct impact on return on 
sales.  One possible reason is that in order to improve ROS, the key issue is to 
minimize costs or maximize net income so that the proportion of net income in total 
sales revenue can be increased. However, multiple directorships do not directly help 
minimize costs through independent monitoring or providing strategic knowledge. 





Hypothesis 2, which predicts the positive relationship between directors with 
external identity of being managers of other companies and firm performance, was 
also partially supported. Different from the results of hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2 
Table 3 goes about here 
Table 2 goes about here 
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received support in Model 1 and 2, but not Model 3. These results suggested that 
directors’ managerial experience and affiliations with other companies are only 
beneficial to certain accounting-based performance such as ROA and ROS.   
Shown in Table 3, hypothesis 3 was not empirically supported and it received 
only marginal support in Model 1. One plausible explanation is that as financial 
resource providers, directors with financial institution affiliations do not necessarily 
have direct impact on firm performance. Unlike directors with multiple directorships, 
who have plenty of knowledge and expertise, the advantage conferred by directors 
with financial institutions affiliation is limited to the accessibility to financial 
resources. Because of lack of relevant experience and knowledge, these directors may 
have little to contribute to strategic planning other than exercising their voting rights. 
Typically, large institutional owners do not facilitate effective firm-level monitoring 
(Dharwadkar, Goranova, Brandes & Khan, 2008). Hence, they are unlikely to have 
tangible influence on firm success.  
Furthermore, due to the affiliations with financial institutions through board 
directors, the easy access to financial resources is likely to result in the focal firm 
having little incentives to improve its performance. To put differently, managers are 
unlikely to cherish and make good use of these financial resources as these resources 
are too readily available. From an economics perspective, this phenomenon is 
relevant as inefficient resource allocation which is harmful to economic performance. 
Therefore, it is likely for companies with representatives of financial institutions on 
boards to experience poor performance.  
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Hypothesis 4 received empirical support only in Model 2 with dependent 
variable of ROS. These results partially supported my prediction that the proportion 
of directors with official political connections is positively related to firm 
performance. These findings suggested that government affiliations related to the 
access to scarce resources and policy privilege can only partially benefit firm 
performance.  
According to the results of main effect model, with the exception of 
hypothesis 3, all other hypotheses received partial support. These results revealed that 
directors with external identities of being directors on other boards, managers of other 
companies, government officers or members of national people’s congress are 
consistent with the internal identity of being board directors of a focal firm. This 
consistency benefitted firm performance through the monitoring and resource 
provision functions. Thus, board diversity is necessary in order to improve firm 
performance. However it should be noted that sometimes a director’s special ties to 
certain resources may affect the efficiency of resource allocation and its utilization. 
Ties such as those with financial institutions do not necessarily contribute to firm 
performance.  
 
5.2 Moderating Effects 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that prior performance has a positive moderating effect 
on the relationship between the proportion of directors with external identity of being 
employees of financial institutions and focal firm performance. It received significant 
support in Model 5 of Table 3. This finding supported my argument that financial 
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institution representatives do not want to invest their money in companies with poor 
performance track records and to put additional effort in monitoring possible 
managerial opportunistic behaviors. The positive moderating effect is shown in 
Figure 5. 2. A.     
The non-significant moderating effect with ROA as dependent variable may 
be explained by the accounting relationship between financial resources and total 
assets. Total assets equal to equity plus debt. Financial resources are typically 
considered as part of debt in accounting practices. When directors, who are 
representatives from financial institutions, bring financial resources to a focal firm, 
the amount of debt will increase. And so will total assets. Meanwhile, ROA will be 
reduced due to the increase of denominator, assuming that net income is kept constant. 
Therefore, when directors bring in financial resources, it is likely for ROA to fall. 
That is why the positive moderating effect does not exist when firm performance is 
measured by ROA.  
One possible reason why the moderating effect is non-significant when using 
ROE as dependent variable could plausibly be related to the usage of financial 
resources. The increase of financial resources through borrowing does not have an 
impact on equity. Additionally, it is most likely that the financial resources will not 
have a direct influence on net income in the short run. This example of the usage of 
financial resources could be extended to production, investments in new projects as it 
would be difficult for them to generate immediate effect by increasing net income. 
Thus, the hypothesis on moderating effect with ROE as the dependent variable did 
not receive support. 
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Similarly, hypothesis 6 received support only in Model 5 of Table 3. The 
result partially supported my prediction of the positive moderating effect of prior 
performance on the relationship between directors with external identity of being 
government officers or members of national people’s congress and firm performance. 
The positive moderating effect is shown in Figure 5. 2. B.  
 
 














Figure 5.2.A goes about here 
Figure 5.2.B goes about here 
Table 4 goes about here 
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSIONS 
 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
The inconclusive findings on the relationship between board directors and 
firm performance have always been a cause of concern for scholars in corporate 
governance literature (Dalton et al., 1998; Hillman et al., 2008). To further 
investigate this relationship, an in-depth and comprehensive examination of director’s 
individual characteristics is necessary. This examination should focus on how certain 
characteristics of a director determine his/her motivation of being a director and 
his/her engagement in monitoring and resource providing behaviors (Hambrick et al., 
2008). This in-depth analysis will advance our understanding on the relationship 
between board directors and firm performance.  
This paper focuses on the external identities of directors to explain how the 
relationship between external and internal identities shapes directors’ behaviors of 
monitoring and resource provision and how such behaviors affect firm performance. 
The external identity of directors is defined as a professional position that a director is 
concurrently holding in another organization. The internal identity is defined as being 
a board director in a focal firm. I have identified four external identities of directors: i) 
being directors of other companies; ii) being managers of other companies; iii) 
employees of financial institutions and iv) government officers or members of 
national people’s congress. Individually, these identities have been found in previous 
literature to have an influence on firm strategic decision making. Based on identity 
theory, I argued that when an external identity conflicts with the internal identity, the 
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conflict will attenuate the motivation of directors to monitor managerial behaviors 
and provide resources. However, when an external identity is consistent with the 
internal identity, this consistency will motivate directors to engage in monitoring and 
resource provision behaviors, ultimately benefitting firm performance.  
My findings are instructive in several ways. First, I found that directors with 
external identities of being directors and managers of other companies and 
government officers or members of national people’s congress are able to contribute 
to focal firm performance. However, directors with external identity of being 
employees of financial institutions do not necessarily help improve focal firm 
performance. One possible reason is that the focal firms may not cherish and make 
good use of the financial resources since they have such easy access to them. In 
summary, the external identities of board directors identified in this paper are 
generally consistent with the internal identity of being board directors in a focal firm. 
This convergence can contribute to firm performance by facilitating monitoring and 
resource provision behaviors. The findings are not trying to show the causality 
between board directors and firm performance, but to prove and explain the positive 
linkages between directors with certain external identities and firm performance.  
Second, prior firm performance has positive moderating effects on the relationship 
between the proportion of directors with external identities of being employees of 
financial institutions and return on sales. It also moderates the relationship between 
the proportion of directors with external identity of being government officers or 
members of national people’s congress and return on sales.   
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6.2 Theoretical Contributions 
This paper applies identity theory, a perspective new to corporate governance 
literature, to explain how board directors with different identities determine board 
functions and affect firm performance. This paper can be viewed as an attempt to 
bring in a new perspective to research on board directors (Hillmean et al., 2008). 
Exploring the identities of directors and their effects on firm performance has 
potential to advance existing literature which is often based on agency theory and 
resource dependency theory. For instance, human agents in agency theory are treated 
homogeneous and share the same identity and incentive structure as long as they are 
classified in the same categories. Identity theory highlights the fact that there are 
various social categories within directors which may modify the motivation and 
behavior of agents. Hence, the various social categories will affect firm performance 
differently. What’s more, this study provides a plausible explanation for the 
inconclusive relationship between board directors which are considered as a 
homogeneous group and firm performance in previous research.  
This paper advances Hillman et al’s (2008) study in two aspects. First, this 
research specifies four professional identities of directors which are more 
theoretically grounded than the identities identified in Hillman et al’s (2008). Second, 
this paper is an empirical study to explore the relationship between different 
directors’ external identities and firm performance. Compared with studies that had 
typically focused on single external affiliation of board directors, this study provides 
a comprehensive examination on how different professional identities of directors 
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affect board functions. Further, this study provides the much needed empirical 
validation on identity theory.  
Empirical findings from this study will enrich scholars’ understanding on the 
relationship between board directors and performance relation. In addition, it sheds 
lights on the innovation of corporate governance research by applying identity theory 
to the domain of corporate governance research. This study is noteworthy in that it 
addresses the limitations of agency theory and resource dependence theory by taking 
into consideration individual difference when explaining board directors and firm 
performance relationship.  
 
6.3 Practical Implications 
Practitioners can gain insights from the findings on director appointment in 
that directors with multiple directorships, managerial positions in other companies 
and official political ties do have contribution to firm performance. When firms enjoy 
stellar performance in the past, the appointment of directors with financial institutions 
and government affiliations will assist firms achieving better performance record. 
However, when firms experienced poor performance, the appointment of these 
directors may not be always effective to improve firm performance.  
Due to China’s reality that the power of decision making is centralized by 
managers, board directors hardly influence strategic decisions. This study provides an 
empirical evidence of the importance of board directors to firm performance. 
Therefore, to improve firm performance and catch up with the advanced western 
management mode, realizing the right of board directors to participate in strategic 
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decision making through monitoring managerial behaviors and providing resources is 
a necessary and determinant step for Chinese corporations. 
 
6.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Study 
Unlike previous studies (eg. Kor & Misangyi, 2008; Kroll et al., 2008) on 
director experience, this study did not categorize director experience into industry-
related and -unrelated. This could be a plausible reason why this paper is not able to 
detect the effect of industry relatedness on the relationship between board directors 
and firm performance. However, this paper captures the characteristics of directors’ 
different external identities and verified if these external identities are consistent with 
their internal identities of being board directors. It provides a broader view of looking 
at directors’ composition on boards than previous literature does.  
Although the cross-sectional nature of the data precluded the drawing of 
casual relation, this paper has its merits in that it provided an empirical test for the 
theoretical argument based on identity theory. Further study is needed to collect 
longitudinal data and year-lag performance can be used as a dependent variable to 
explore the casual relationship between directors and firm performance. Moreover, a 
greater period of year-lag for prior performance could be used to improve the 
robustness of the moderation model.   
Although the relationship between board directors and board functions has 
been well established in previous literatures (eg, Hillman et al., 2008), an advanced 
model with board functions as a mediator between directors with different external 
identities and firm performance could possibly be a promising research direction for 
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further study. However, due to limitations in data, this paper introduces the 
theoretical arguments that board functions can be a mediator, but this relationship is 
not empirically tested. Other research methods, such as survey (Westphal, 1999; 
McDonald et al., 2008), could be used for further research in order to obtain variables 
on board functions.  
 
6.5 Conclusions 
Despite its limitations, this paper is instructive in that its findings suggested 
that directors with external identities of being directors and mangers of other 
companies and government officers or members of national people’s congress are 
positively related to focal firm performance. Moreover, prior performance of focal 
firm has positive moderating effects on the relationship between directors with 
external identity of being representatives of financial institutions and firm 
performance and the relationship of directors with external identity of being 
government officers or members of national people’s congress and firm performance. 
This paper provides a novel insight to research on board directors by focusing on 
directors’ identities and enriches corporate governance literature with empirical 
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Figure 5. 2. A. Moderating effect of prior performance on the relation 





























                           
Figure 5. 2. B. Moderating effect of prior performance on the relation 
between ROS and directors with external identity as government officers 






































Table 1.  Industry distribution of the sample  
  
Industry category No. of observations 
Energy 19 
Materials 231 
Capital Goods 210 
Commercial & Professional Services 5 
Transportation 58 
Automobiles and Components 39 
Consumer Durables and Apparel 89 
Consumer Services 18 
Media 8 
Retailing 48 
Food & Staples Retailing 5 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 63 
Household & Personal Products 5 
Health Care Equipment & Services 13 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 74 
Diversified Financials 2 
Real Estate 64 
Software & Services 23 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 70 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 3 
Telecommunication Services 2 
Utilities 51 
Total number of sampled firms  1100 
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Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Proportion of directors with external identity as directors of 
other firms 
1100 0.49 0.36             
2. Proportion of directors with external identity as managers of 
other firms 
1100 0.54 0.33 0.37***            
3. Proportion of directors with external identity as 
representatives of financial institutions 
1100 0.03 0.08 0.07* 0.19***           
4. Proportion of directors with external identity as government 
officers or members of national people's congress 
1100 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.05          
5. ROA 1100 0.04 0.04 0.10*** 0.01** -0.03 0.01         
6. ROS 1100 0.08 0.10 0.08* 0.18*** 0.02 0.08** 0.54***        
7. ROE 1100 0.08 0.07 0.01*** 0.07* 0.01 -0.02 0.82*** 0.37***       
8. ROA of prior year 1036 0.04 0.03 0.11*** 0.07* -0.03 0.00 0.78*** 0.47*** 0.62***      
9. ROS of prior year 1036 0.07 0.10 0.09** 0.14*** 0.00 0.05† 0.42*** 0.70*** 0.28*** 0.53***     
10. ROE of prior year 1036 0.07 0.07 0.12*** 0.06† 0.00 -0.02 0.64*** 0.34*** 0.72*** 0.82*** 0.38***    
11. Firm size by total assets (log) 1100 9.32 0.46 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.08* 0.25*** 0.17*** 0.06* 0.30***   
12. Firm age 1100 10.65 3.69 -0.06* -0.07* 0.03 0.05† -0.09** -0.03 -0.04 -0.10** -0.05 -0.05 0.31  
13. Ownership (dummy) 1100 0.68 0.47 0.02 0.23*** 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.28*** 
-
0.08* 
  †p < 0.1. *p < 0.05. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001.                
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Table 3. OLS regression models predicting proportion of directors with different external 
identities and firm performance relations 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent variables (ROA) (ROS) (ROE) (ROA) (ROS) (ROE) 
Independent variables       
Proportion of directors with external identity as board 
directors of other firms (Dir) 
0.006* 0.001 0.011* 0.000 0.003 0.001 
(0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) 
Proportion of directors with external identity as managers of 
other firms (Mgr) 
0.008* 0.036*** 0.011 0.005 0.020* 0.019* 
(0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) 
Proportion of directors with external identity as 
representatives of financial institutions (Fin) 
-0.023† -0.019 -0.023 -0.023† -0.07* -0.046 
(0.013) (0.034) (0.026) (0.013) (0.033) (0.030) 
Proportion of directors with external identity as government 
officers or members of national people's congress (Gov) 
0.005 0.219*** -0.045 -0.018 -0.050 -0.050 
(0.0243) (0.062) (0.047) (0.023) (0.057) (0.058) 
ROA-2005    0.808***   
    (0.046)   
ROS-2005     0.608***  
     (0.048)  
ROE-2005      0.812*** 
      (0.051) 
Dir*ROA-2005    0.011   
    (0.062)   
Mgr*ROA-2005    0.008   
    (0.070)   
Fin*ROA-2005    0.348   
    (0.285)   
Gov*ROA-2005    0.462   
    (0.499)   
Dir*ROS-2005     -0.108  
     (0.066)  
Mgr*ROS-2005     -0.037  
     (0.076)  
Fin*ROS-2005     0.598**  
     (0.209)  
Gov*ROS-2005     1.715***  
     (0.352)  
Dir*ROE-2005      0.000 
      (0.072) 
Mgr*ROE-2005      -0.131 
      (0.080) 
Fin*ROE-2005      0.524 
      (0.322) 
Gov*ROE-2005      0.432 
Control variables       
Firm Size 0.007** 0.005 0.040*** 0.000 0.008† 0.010** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
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Firm Age -0.0004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.0003) (0.0008 ) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0004) 
State ownership  -0.006* -0.009 -0.016** -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
Constant -0.039 0.036 -0.311*** -0.001 -0.057 -0.086* 
 (0.024) (0.063) (0.047) (0.017) (0.049) (0.038) 
Adjusted-R² 0.074 0.233 0.086 0.607 0.534 0.514 
N 1100 1100 1100 1036 1036 1036 
a. Standard errors in parentheses.  †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.     
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Table 4. Summary of hypothesis test 
    
Model No.  Hypothesis description Result 
Main effect 
H1 
The proportion of directors with external identity of being directors on other 
boards is positively related to firm performance. 
Partially Supported 
H2 
The proportion of directors with external identity of being managers of other 
companies is positively related to firm performance. 
Partially Supported 
H3 
The proportion of directors with external identity of being employees of financial 
institutions is positively related to firm performance. 
Not supported 
H4 
The proportion of directors with external identity of being government officers or 




Prior performance has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between the 
proportion of directors with external identity of being employees of financial 
institutions and focal firm performance.  
Partially Supported 
H6 
Prior performance has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between the 
proportion of directors with the external identity of government officers or 
members of national people’s congress and focal firm performance.  
Partially Supported 
